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1. Introduction

The Issue of Public Sector Collective Bargaining
significant single phenomenon III the area of
labor relations in the past ten years has been the rapid emergence
of collective bargaining in the public sector of the United States
economy. This phenomenon has occurred at all levels of government and has encompassed many diverse groups of employees. Of
course, the major labor legislation which has been enacted in this
country-the Wagner Act, the Taft-Hartley Act and the LandrumGriffin Act-has excluded consideration of public sector employees.
But the signing of Executive Order 10988 by President John F.
Kennedy in 1962 opened the door to collective bargaining arrangements for federal employees. It also led state legislatures across
the country to pass laws according public employees most of the
rights which their private sector counterparts had earlier acquired.
This phenomenon raises some new and important questions
for economists. The profession has been concerned for some time
with the wage and employment effects of unions, but this concern
has centered primarily on those private sector labor markets where
unions have historically been strong. The belief persists that labor
markets in the public sector are somehow different. Recently, for
instance, several attempts have been made to develop theories of
wage determination in public employment, and most of these theoretical undertakings have considered unionization in some way as
a relevant variable. 1
Moreover, from a public policy point of view, improvement in
our knowledge of the effects of collective bargaining in the public
sector is crucial. In the private sector experts have long recognized
the social, political, and economic legitimacy of unions. Albert
Rees, for example, in his well-known book The Economics of Trade
Unions, states:
PERHAPS THE MOST

If the job rights won for workers by unions are not conceded by the rest of

society simply because they are just, they should be conceded because they help
to protect the minimum consensus that keeps our society stable. In my judgement, the economic losses impossed by unions are not too high a price to pay
for their successful performance of this role. 2
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However, the applicability of this type of argument to unionization in the public sector has been seriously questioned. In an
important recent book, Harry H. Wellington and Ralph K. Winter,
Jr., have argued:
Collective bargaining in public employment . . . seems distinguishable from
that in the private sector. . . . It imposes on society more than a potential
misallocation of resources through restrictions on economic output, the principal
cost imposed by private sector unions. Collective bargaining by public employees
and the political process cannot be separated . . . the issue is how powerful
unions will be in the typical municipal political process if a full transplant of
collective bargaining is carried out.
The conclusion is that such a transplant would, in many cases, institu·
tionalize the power of public employee unions in a way that would leave
competing groups in the political process at a permanent and substantial disadvantage. 3

Besides the inconvenience to voters and the possibility that
prolonged disruption of public sector service provision would
endanger the public health and safety, Wellington and Winter
envison another reason, economic in nature, which might give
unions in the public sector an advantage greater than that which
exists for their private sector counterparts. In their view, the
demand for many public sector goods and services is relatively
inelastic. Hence, because the demand for labor is a derived demand,
the wage-employment trade off is reduced for workers in public
employment and union power may be realized more easily and
exploiLed more fully than in the private sector. 4
The above arguments suggest a need for extensive research into
the area of wage and salary effects of collective bargaining in the
public sector. For a number of reasons, the group of workers for
which research appears most fruitful is public school teachers. First,
from a pragmatic point of view, data are more readily available for
this public sector profession than for most. This stems from the
relative maturity of the teacher organizational movement. Teachers
have been organized into professional organizations, some affiliated
with organized labor and many not so affiliated, for over 100 years.
Since the turn of the century, these organizations have been fairly
active in collecting and compiling data on the profession.
Secondly, teachers' salaries have historically been ranked toward
the bottom of all professional employments, and cost-of-living increases in the 1960s probably eroded this position even further. G
Thus the profession was particularly responsive to the recent public
sector bargaining movement.

Introduction
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Finally, the early successes with collective bargaining experienced by the American Federation of Teachers have elicited a
response from the less militant National Education Association,
which now is also insisting upon joint teacher-board of education
determination of salaries and conditions of employment. In short,
public school teachers have had a much more extensive experience
with collective bargaining than most other public sector occupations.

Purpose of the Research
The purpose of this study will be to determine some of the
salary effects which are associated with professional negotiations in
the public schools of Nebraska. 6 The state of Nebraska provides
an excellent framework within which to estimate such effects. The
fact that teacher certification requirements, public employee bargaining statutes, the cost-of-living, etc., vary among states points to
the advantage of limiting the study to a single state teacher market.
This had been overlooked in much of the research to date. Secondly, Nebraska has an unusually large number of school districts,
with both rural and urban influences, owing to the failure of any
widespread consolidation attempts, and these districts represent a
rather broad spectrum of the successes and failures of professional
negotiations. 7 Finally, Nebraska has recently developed a somewhat unusual method of handling labor disputes in public employment through its Court of Industrial Relations.

Organization
Chapters 2 and 3 will provide some background information
which will be helpful in understanding and evaluating the empirical chapters. Chapter 2 will include a very brief history of organized teacher activity, both nationally and in Nebraska. It will also
outline and evaluate the Nebraska statutes dealing with teacher
negotiations, including within the discussion a summary of pertinent decisions of the above-mentioned Court of Industrial Relations. Chapter 3 will then briefly summarize and evaluate the
important empirical studies which have already been undertaken
in this area.
Chapter 4 provides evidence on the first empirical question of
this study. An analysis of average teachers' salaries by school district
in Nebraska from the mid-1960s on reveals a rather unusual decline

4

/

Some Salary Effects of Professional Negotiations

in the differential between average secondary salaries and average
elementary salaries in many districts, with an equally unusual persistence and even widening of such differentials in some other
districts. Chapter 4 will constitute an attempt to explain empirically
variations in the magnitude of this secondary-elementary differential among school districts at a point in time following the introduction of Nebraska's teacher negotiation statutes. Among other
things, it will be hypothesized that the emergence of professional
negotiations in many Nebraska school districts in the late 1960s
contributed to the narrowing of this differential in those districts.
A multiple regression model will be developed in Chapter 4 to
analyze and explain interdistrict variations in the secondary-elementary differential.
The second empirical question, dealt with in chapter 5, concerns the existence of interdistrict variations in teachers' salary
levels at a point in time. 8 In other words, the question asked is:
Why do some school districts pay equally qualified teachers more
than other districts during a particular school year? A salary
determination regression model for public schools in Nebraska will
be developed in chapter 5 in an attempt to explain these interdistrict salary level variations. Again it will be hypothesized that,
after other relevant variables are taken into account, teachers'
salaries will tend to be higher in a given district for a given school
year where professional negotiations have taken place.
Chapters 4 and 5, then, will provide statistical estimates of the
extent to which variations in the magnitudes of two important
salary effects may be explained by the existence of professional
negotiations between teachers and boards of education in Nebraska.
Chapter 6 will draw conclusions and implications from the empirical work and will point out some areas where further research
is warranted.

2. Historical and Legal Background

of the historical and legal framework for teacher
negotiations will provide an appropriate perspective for analyzing
the impact of such negotiations upon teachers' salaries. This chapter attempts to provide such a perspective. A very brief summary
of the history of organized teacher activity, both nationally and in
Nebraska, will be presented first. Secondly, an elaboration and
analysis of the Nebraska teacher negotiation statutes, including
reference to key court interpretations, will be given.
CONSIDERATION

The History of Organized Teacher Activity
The AFT. Contrary to popular belief, teacher unionism is not a
relatively new phenomenon. As early as 1897, the Chicago Teachers Federation constituted a viable and active organization of
teachers, and in 1902 this organization became affiliated with the
Chicago Federation of Labor. 1 Prior to World War I at least
twenty-one other teacher organizations in eleven states became
affiliated with organized labor locals. 2
Historically, two primary organizations have been active in the
organization of teachers, the American Federation of Teachers
(AFT) and the National Education Association (NEA). The AFT
was formed in 1916 and soon became affiliated with the American
Federation of Labor. It experienced sporadic but significant growth
after its formation and by 1971 had almost 250,000 dues-paying
members.3 Throughout its history, the AFT has emphasized and
sought to improve the salary levels and working conditions of
teachers. More recently, it has become actively involved in the
organization of teachers at the college and university level. In
Nebraska, however, the AFT has met with little success in organizing public school teachers for purposes of collective bargaining.
Relatively unsuccessful organizational attempts have been made in
Omaha and Lincoln, and virtually no success has been achieved in
any other area of the state.
The NEA. The NEA, and its state affiliate the Nebraska State
Education Association (NSEA), has been the organizing body for

5
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almost all Nebraska elementary and secondary teachers. Hence,
most of this section will be devoted to their activities. The existence of teacher organizations which were not affiliated with
organized labor predates considerably the emergence of teacher
unions. However, the concern of such organizations historically
has been with the professional improvement of the teaching profession, rather than with the specific issues of remuneration and
working conditions. In 1857 the National Teachers Association
(NT A) became the first national organization of teachers and in
1870 the National Association of School Superintendents and the
American Normal School Association merged with the NT A to
form the NEA. 4
It was not until 1905, however, that there appears any clear
indication of the NEA's active concern for teachers' salaries and
working conditions. During that year, the NEA published a major
report on teachers' salaries. This report demonstrated the need for
substantial improvement in some areas and generated considerable
concern within the profession. 5 However, at no time prior to
World War II did the NEA call for any form of collective bargaining, although it became progressively more vocal in its demands
for higher teachers' salaries during the first few decades of the
twentieth century. 6
During the 1940s and especially after World War II a relatively
new tactic, the strike, was adopted by several teacher organizations
in the face of a relative decline in earnings. Some sixty-nine strikes
occurred during the decade, fifty-seven of which took place after
1946. And surprisingly, as many striking locals were affiliated with
the NEA as with the AFT, although both organizations had specifically repudiated the strike as a weapon for solving disputes and
the NEA had only just begun to accept any form of "group action"
as a means of obtaining professional salaries. 7 Thus it appears that
these strikes were attributable to local disenchantment rather than
an allegiance to any particular national organization.
By 1951, several states, including Nebraska, had enacted legislation prohibiting strikes in public employment. For instance, Sec.
48-802-(2) of the Nebraska Public and Utility Employees Act of
1947, as amended, states: "No right shall exist in any natural or
corporate person or group of persons to hinder, delay, limit, or
suspend the continuity or efficiency of any governmental service or
governmental service in a proprietary capacity of this state, either
by strike, lockout, or other means." 8
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During the 1950s the striking activity largely subsided. There
no evidence of any strike involving an affiliate of the NEA between 1951 and 1963. 9
Although, as mentioned above, the NEA enacted a policy statement in 1947 encouraging group teacher action, there was very
little intensification of these efforts by NEA affiliates in the 1950s.
By 1961, however, a new environment had emerged. A local of the
AFT had boycotted classes in New York City in 1960 and 1962 and
had gained a collectively bargained agreement by July 1962. At
the 1961 Atlantic City convention of the NEA a resolution concerning teacher-board of education relations was adopted. It stated,
in part:
IS

The National Education Association believes ... that professional education
associations should be accorded the right ... to participate in the determination
of policies of common concern including salary and other conditions for professional service . . . . [This participation] should preclude the arbitrary exercise
of unilateral authority by boards of education and the use of the strike by
teachers as a means for enforcing economic demands. 10

The following year at the Denver convention, Resolution No.
18 was adopted, which modified the resolution above. Instead of
stating a belief "that professional education associations should be
accorded the right" of participatory decision-making, the 1961 resolution was reworded to state: "The National Education Association
insists on the right of professional associations" to participate in
decisions of common interest. This resolution also contained the
first reference to the term professional negotiations. 11 By 1965, the
reference to the preclusion of the use of strikes by teachers, which
was found in the 1961 and all subsequent resolutions, was omitted,
and in 1968 the delegation gave official support to striking affiliates. 12 Thus there is evidence of a rather consistent and continual
increase in the militancy advocated by the NEA, especially since
the emergence of a viable AFT as a competitor for membership.
The NSEA. The Nebraska State Education Association is one of
sixty-six state and territorial associations affiliated with the NEA.
Strictly speaking, however, the NSEA is an independent, incorporated organization whose policies are not controlled or superseded
by the NEA. The NSEA was originally founded in 1867 and was
reorganized in 1922 into its present form as a corporation with
employees. Active voting membership is open to all people engaged

8
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1ll teaching or the supervision of teaching in Nebraska.
The
organization had 19,140 members during the 1972~73 school year. 13
The NSEA's present activities consist primarily of consultation
with local associations on negotiations and professional rights and
responsibilities, and of lobbying during Nebraska legislative sessions
for legislation in the interest of the teaching profession. Six fulltime men are employed to work with local associations throughout
the state on a continuous basis. And, to a significant extent, the
present teacher negotiation laws in Nebraska which are discussed
in the following section owe their existence to the lobbying efforts
of the NSEA in the mid and late 1960s.

Nebraska Teacher Negotiation Statutes
The Nebraska Public and Utility Employees Act. The Nebraska
statutes dealing with teacher negotiations actually may be traced
back to the 1947 Nebraska Public and Utility Employees Act
mentioned earlier. Owing to an impending telephone strike, the
1947 Unicameral passed this act with an emergency clause putting
it immediately into effect. The act called for the formation of the
Court of Industrial Relations (CIR), composed of five judges to
be appointed by the governor, with the consent of the legislature.
A six-year staggered term was established. This court was given
the authority to settle labor disputes so as to maintain the uninterrupted operation of Nebraska's public utilities. The original
statute specifically excluded employment in governmental service
from the jurisdiction of the CIR. The establishment of the CIR,
however, set a precedent which was conducive to the extension
of its jurisdiction in the 1960s. 14
By 1965, it was apparent that a need for legislation concerning
labor relations in public employment existed. During that year
the Nebraska Supreme Court ruled that the CIR did not have the
jurisdiction to order bargaining between the city of Hastings and
utility employees represented by the International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers. 15
The Nebraska Teachers' Professional Negotiations Act. In 1967
the Nebraska Unicameral amended the 1947 Court of Industrial
Relations Act, as it had come to be called, so as to extend the
jurisdiction of the CIR to governmental services rendered in a
proprietary capacity. In this session the legislature also passed the
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Nebraska Teachers' Professional Negotiations Act, the first labor
legislation dealing specifically with teachers. 16 This act, submitted
as L. B. 485, asserted the right of teachers in Class III, IV, and V
school districts to organize for purposes of representation on matters
of employment relations. 17 However, this statute required recognition by the school board only if a majority of the board's members
so desired. After the teacher organization's request to the board
to meet and confer on matters of board-employee relations, the
statute allowed the board thirty days to accept or reject this request,
in whole or in part, and to notify the organization in writing as
to its decision. If the request is granted by the board, and if mutual
agreement is reached on the terms and conditions of employment,
the statute provides that all matters are to be reduced to writing
and signed by representatives of both parties. Where disagreement
on employment matters persists, provisions are made for the submission of the dispute to a fact-finding board for review and
recommendations. Although these recommendations are to receive
the good faith consideration of both parties, they are not binding
upon either. If negotiations arrive at an impasse and the recommendations of the fact-finding board are rejected by one or both
parties, or if the board rejects the organization's request to negotiate "in whole," the provisions of the act are considered to have
been exhausted.
It should be obvious that the statute was intended to be permissive in nature. However, teacher organization, recognition, and
mutual board-teacher decision-making did receive legal sanction
through the statute and this alone constituted a significant departure from previous unilateral determination of teachers' salaries
and conditions of employment. Beginning with the 1967-68 school
year and continuing thereafter, local and county teachers' associations throughout Nebraska began to seek legal recognition from
their respective school boards for purposes of collective representation on employment matters.
L. B. 15, the 1969 Amendment. Despite the progress achieved
under L. B. 485, obvious limitations still existed in the statutory

framework which had been established. In 1969 a bill was introduced into the Unicameral which was modeled after New York's
Taylor Act. 18 This bill originally would have created a Public
Employment Relations Board for Nebraska to settle disputes involving governmental service. In its final form, the bill was modi-

10
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fied so as to utilize the existing Court of Industrial Relations
rather than creating a new board. Thus the bill became another
amendment to the Court of Industrial Relations Act and, after
passage, created a method of handling public employee relations
which had a more judicial orientation than those which existed
in most states.
As amended, the act covers employees of the state of Nebraska,
political subdivisions thereof, municipal corporations, and public
power and irrigation districts. Under the act persons, organizations,
or school districts which are subject to the jurisdiction of the
Nebraska Teachers' Professional Negotiations Act (L. B. 485) are
excluded from the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations
until all provisions of L. B. 485 are exhausted. Thus, the present
CIR has jurisdiction over labor disputes in the above-mentioned
public sector entities, and it may determine equitable settlements
upon petition by employer or employee groups in these organizations. It has the power to issue summons or subpoenas, to compel
production of documents, to make investigations, and to certify
secret ballot representation results. Orders of the CIR are appealable directly to the Nebraska Supreme Court. Finally, lockouts,
strikes, slowdowns and other work stoppages are still illegal under
the amended act. 19
Summary of Present Legal Framework. For public school teachers
in Nebraska, the present legal procedures may be summarized as
follows. Under L. B. 485, all teachers in Class III, IV, and V
districts have the right to organize, where such organizations have
the right to represent their members in matters of employment
relations with local school boards. Following a request by the
organization to the school board to meet and confer, the board
may accept or reject the request in whole or in part. If the board
rejects the request in whole, the provisions of L. B. 485 are
exhausted and the teacher organization may invoke the jurisdiction
of the CIR under the 1947 act, as amended in 1969. If the board
accepts the request to meet and confer, in part or in whole, then
negotiations proceed and a fact-finding board may be convened in
the case of impasse. If the recommendations of the fact-finding
board are rejected by one or both parties, the provisions of L. B.
485 are again exhausted and either party may take the dispute to
the CIR for settlement. If agreement is reached at any stage in
the process, all matters are to be reduced to writing and signed

Historical and Legal Background
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by members of both parties. In practice, this last provision of a
signed master contract has often been overlooked by the disputants.
The status of Class 1, II, and VI school districts is somewhat
less certain. Since these districts are not covered by L. B. 485, but
since they are political subdivisions of the state of Nebraska as
provided in L. B. 15, the present interpretation is that they fall
directly under the jurisdiction of the CIR as stipulated in the
1947 act as amended. This is a less than ideal status for these
districts, however, in that there are no provisions for formal recognition, impasse, fact-finding, etc., to which they are subject. To
date, the existence of formal negotiations in these districts is fairly
uncommon.

Key Court Interpretations
CIR Salary-Setting Authority. With respect to the negotiations laws,
perhaps the key element in the Nebraska statutory framework was
the establishment of salary-setting authority with the CIR, a highly
unusual ceding of budgetary power. Section 48-818 of the Nebraska
Public and Utility Employees Act, as amended in 1969, contains
the provisions setting forth the salary-setting authority of the Court.
The finding and order or orders may establish or alter the scale of wages,
hours of labor, or conditions of employment, or anyone or more of the same.
In making such findings and order or orders, the Court of Industrial Relations
shall establish rates of pay and conditions of employment which are comparable to the prevalent wage rates paid and conditions of employment maintained
for the same or similar skills under the same or similar working conditions. In
establishing wage rates the court shall take into consideration the overall compensation presently received by the employees, having regard not only to wages
for time actually worked, but also wages for time not worked, including vacation,
holidays, and other excused time, and all benefits received, including insurance
and pensions, and the continuity and stability of employment enjoyed by the
employees. 20

Thus the Court is authorized to make salary and conditions of
employment settlements, when petitioned to do so under the provisions of the act, which are in accordance with standards of comparability with similar work, workers, and conditions. Not unexpectedly, the interpretation of comparability and the determination
of similar work, workers, and conditions have been the sources of
continuing controversy in recent key Court decisions.

The Milford Case. In the Milford case,21 the CIR rejected the
petition filed by the Milford Education Association on the grounds
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that the over-all compensation in the salary schedule proposed by
the school board was comparable to the present wages paid in other
similar districts. The teachers' association was asking for only a
$100 increase in the base pay, index increments for every nine
hours of additional course work instead of twelve, and $11 per
month instead of $10 for health and accident insurance. The CIR
defined twenty-nine school districts as being comparable to Milford's, primarily on the basis of student enrollment, and found that
only one of these twenty-nine districts provided over-all compensation greater than that set by the Milford school board.

The Weeping Water Case. Again in the Weeping Water case, 22
the petition of the plaintiff teachers' association was rejected by
the Court as it was determined that the salary schedule adopted
by the school board met the statutory criteria. Here the CIR noted
that the parties had been negotiating for several months and that
agreement had been reached on all matters except base salary. The
ruling argued that consideration should be given to the history of
the negotiations and the litigation between the parties, and that
the burden was on the plaintiff to demonstrate that the provisions
of the statute had not been complied with.
The Seward Case. Perhaps the most significant case to come before
the CIR was the 1971 dispute in the Seward, Nebraska, school district. 23 At issue here was not only a disagreement between the disputants with respect to salaries and conditions of employment. Two
broader issues also came under consideration, namely the legitimacy
and necessity of an index salary schedule and the legality of the
salary-setting authority of the CIR. The Seward school board argued
that the imposition of a uniform index salary schedule infringed
upon the rights of the school district and was discriminatory against
beginning teachers. The Court concluded:
We do not hold or infer that an index salary schedule may be required in
all cases. Our decision in this case is based on the evidence in the record that
an index salary will, in this instance, establish comparable rates of pay and
will effectuate the purposes of Chapter 48, Article 8.24

Of even more significance was the school district's argument that
the salary-setting authority of the Court was negated by Sec.
48-810.01 of the Court of Industrial Relations Act, which states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of the law, the State of Nebraska and
any other political or governmental subdivision thereof cannot be compelled
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to enter into any contract or agreement, written or otherwise, with any labor
organization concerning grievances, labor disputes, rates of pay, hours of employment or conditions of work. 25

The Court ruled, however, that its order was not a contract
or agreement and that acceptance of the Seward district's contentions would nullify the authority granted to the Court in Sec.
48-818 of the act. The ruling of the Court was appealed to the
Nebraska Supreme Court and on 12 July, 1972 the Supreme Court
affirmed four to three the CIR order. 26
Thus by the summer of 1972 the statutory framework which
recognized the legitimacy of bilateral determination of teachers'
salaries and conditions of employment was firmly established in
Nebraska. The effects of such negotiations were presumably being
felt prior to this time, however, owing to the existence of formal
professional negotiations in many districts in the late 1960s. And
Nebraska teachers have experienced a modest, although not insignificant, improvement in salaries relative to other states during
the general period in question. During the 1966-67 school year,
the estimated average classroom teacher salary in Nebraska was
$5,619 whereas the national average was $6,821. The Nebraska
salary figure ranked forty-first nationally for 1966-67. By the
1972-73 school year, the corresponding figures were $8,730 for
Nebraska and $10,460 nationally. Although still well below the
national average, Nebraska had improved its rank to thirty-fourth
by this time. 27 Of course, these figures, by themselves, provide no
evidence of a relationship between the emergence of professional
negotiations and the indicated relative salary improvement of
Nebraska's teachers. Before turning to the empirical question of the
magnitude of any salary effects associated with professional negotiations in Nebraska, chapter 3 will be devoted to a brief summary
and evaluation of related empirical studies which have attempted
to determine various economic effects associated with such negotiations.

3. Prior Empirical Work

A S INDICATED EARLIER,

the emergence of professional negotiations
for public school teachers is a recent phenomenon. It has only been
during the last eight to ten years that such negotiations have
occurred within a legitimate legal environment. Not surprisingly,
therefore, meaningful empirical research attempting to determine
the economic effects of such negotiations is of an even more recent
vintage. This chapter will briefly survey and evaluate a relatively
limited number of studies which deal with these issues. I will conclude by summarizing some general shortcomings of the existing
work, so as to provide a convenient perspective for the empirical
extensions of chapters 4 and 5.

The Rehmus-Wilner Study
In a 1968 University of Michigan monograph, Charles Rehmus
and Evan Wilner examined a sample of twelve Michigan school districts within which professional negotiations had begun in 1966-67. 1
They estimated the average annual percentage changes in B.A.
minimum and M.A. maximum salary levels for these districts for
the years from 1961 to 1968. They found that the average annual
percentage increase in B.A. minimum salaries from 1961 to 1966
was 2.8%, whereas from 1966 to 1968 it jumped to 8.5%. Much
the same pattern was observed for the average annual percentage
increases in M.A. maximum salary levels-3.5% annually prior to
1966 and 10.5% thereafter. Rehmus and Wilner concluded that
negotiations had produced salary increases nearly three times higher
than they would have been in the absence of such negotiations.
Of course, this study is subject to important limitations which
cast suspicion upon their conclusion. It is quite possible that other
factors could have caused the significant salary increases after 1965.
The authors made no attempt to derive a differential or relative
salary effect attributable to negotiations. The sample size was
severely limited, casting doubt on the external validity of the
results. The techniques employed do not allow for the assignment
of levels of statistical significance to the results. Finally, there is
considerable evidence that the years 1965-67 were ones of very rapid
increases in salary levels for both organized and unorganized teach15
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ers.2 Fortunately, somewhat more precise and meaningful statistical
techniques have been used in more recent studies.
The Thornton Study

One of the more comprehensive studies was completed in 1970
by Robert Thornton. 3 Thornton employed a least-squares multiple
regression model with minimum and maximum B.A. and M.A.
salary levels as alternative dependent variables and a negotiatingnonnegotiating dummy variable as one of the independent variables. Utilizing 1969 cross-sectional data from eighty-three school
districts across the nation which were located in cities of at least
100,000 population, as well as negotiations data from a Brookings
Institution questionnaire, Thornton formulated a separate regression equation for each of the alternative salary specifications. The
coefficients of the negotiation variable were all of the expected
positive sign and were all statistically significant. The corresponding
salary differentials ranged from $160 at the M.A. minimum level
to $3,132 for the M.A. maximum, or in relative terms, from 2.3%
to 28.8%. After adjustments for spurious correlation, Thornton
concluded that professional negotiations had raised teachers' salaries above those in nonnegotiating districts by from 1% to 4%
at the three lower salary steps to 23% at the M.A. maximum level.
Although the Thornton study constitutes a significant improvement over previous work, certain weaknesses remain. The coefficient of determination for the M.A. maximum regression drops to
.07, which leaves one with diminished confidence in the explanatory
power of this specification. Once again, the external validity of
the study may be questioned due to Thornton's consideration of
only larger city school districts. Finally, the multi state nature of
the sample presents problems. As mentioned at the outset, many
rf'levant factors are variable among different state teacher markets,
and disregard for these variations may cause errors in the estimation
of the effects of teacher negotiations.
The Kasper Study

A study which has received considerably more cntICISm than
the Thornton work was published in 1970 by Hirschel Kasper. 4
Kasper attempted to estimate the effects of negotiations on average
state-wide teacher salaries for the 1967-68 school year, using state
per capita income, extent of urbanization, support from state reve-
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nues, expenditures per pupil, and the strength of teacher organization as primary independent variables in his model. Data were
gathered from state sources and from AFT and NEA headquarters.
Several alternative measures of both salaries and organizational
strength were used and both single equation and two-stage leastsquares estimates were obtained. In the single equation form, Kasper
found no significant salary effect related to teacher bargaining
strength. The two-stage estimates showed a significant effect attributable to negotiations of no more than 4%.
Both conceptual and statistical problems exist in the study.
Teacher negotiations typically occur at the local school district
level, not on a state-wide level. No interdistrict, intrastate comparisons were made in the study and no index of local bargaining
strength was employed. Misspecification of the organizational
strength variable was another limitation. Kasper's primary organizational strength variable was obtained by summing the number of
instructional personnel represented in local district negotiations
and dividing that number by the total number of classroom teachers in the state. Instructional personnel was defined so as to include
principals, supervisors, librarians, etc., who are usually not covered
under a negotiated agreement. This variable is also defined very
broadly so as to include everything from the simplest recognition
agreement to formal negotiations. Finally, both Kasper and Thornton hypothesize a positive relationship between teacher salaries
and the presence of negotiations, yet each performs a two-tailed
significance test of the regression coefficient.

The Landon-Baird Study

In 1972, John Landon and Robert Baird published a modified
version of an earlier study which was designed specifically to overcome the weaknesses of the Kasper and Thornton studies. 5 The
authors collected data from forty-four school districts of 25,000 to
50,000 enrollment. These data contained information on membership in teacher organizations and on bargaining arrangements in
these districts. Using multiple regression equations similar to those
of Kasper and Thornton, with beginning teachers' salaries as the
dependent variable, they employed three different specifications for
the teacher organization variable. These were: (1) a dummy form
similar to Thornton's, (2) the percentage of teachers in a district
who were members of the NEA, and (3) the percentage of teachers
who were members of the AFT. With the first specification, Landon
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and Baird found that salaries tended to be significantly higher in
negotiating districts, by 4.9% or $251.17 on the average. With the
NEA variable, the coefficient was positive but of lesser significance
than the dummy variable coefficient. The AFT coefficient became
negative and insignificant.
Unfortunately, there are also some problems inherent in the
Landon-Baird analysis. They seem to fall into the same potential
trap as did Thornton in considering only large school districts.
And although they are critical of both the Thornton and the
Kasper specifications of the negotiation variable, their alternatives
appear to offer little improvement. Their first specification is essentially the same as Thornton's and it provides the most significant
results. The percentage of teachers who are members of the NEA
may not meaningfully indicate bargaining power. In many states
in the late 1960s, including Nebraska, unified membership in a
local association, the state NEA affiliate, and the NEA was not
required. Thus teachers in a given school district might be actively
engaged in negotiations while having no members in the NEA.
Alternatively, a district might have 100% NEA membership and
yet not be negotiating at all. And the AFT variable is clearly inappropriate, as the authors admit, in that the local membership in
the AFT averaged only about 10% in their sample. Finally, Landon
and Baird's use of beginning teachers' salaries as the sole dependent
variable is questionable. Several authors have argued that beginning
salaries are still largely set by market forces and that the real
opportunity to utilize bargaining power comes at the B.A. maximum, M.A. minimum, and M.A. maximum steps. 6
The Frey Study

A study with perhaps the most advanced theoretical base developed to date was undertaken by Donald Frey in his doctoral
dissertation completed at Princeton University in 1972. 7 His model
used both base pay and maximum pay as dependent variables. Both
cross-sectional and pooled data from 298 New Jersey school districts were utilized. The sample was limited to those districts which
had at least 750 pupils enrolled. The cross-sectional results revealed
no significant effect on either base payor maximum pay associated
with teacher negotiations. For the pooled regressions, the study
indicated that negotiations may have raised the base pay from 0.4%
to 2% in negotiating districts. However, the impact of negotiations
on maximum pay was either insignificant or negative.
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Frey's study is in many ways superior to previous work, primarily
because he recognizes the importance of limiting the analysis to a
single state teacher market. Some shortcomings remain, however.
As in previous studies, Frey restricts his sample to relatively large
school districts, although this restriction is not nearly so severe as,
for instance, in the Landon-Baird study. Nevertheless, almost one
half of the school districts in New Jersey were omitted.
Secondly, the New Jersey Labor Mediation Act was amended in
1968 to create a Public Employment Relations Commission. Thus
the first year that results of formal bargaining could have been
observed was the 1969-70 school year, the last year which Frey
considers in his study. Although Frey discounts this possibility, it
may be that this first year was a transitional one wherein the full
impact of formal negotiations had not yet been felt.
Thirdly, Frey uses a dummy variable for professional negotiations which takes the value of one for districts with contracts on
file with the Public Employment Relations Commission for the
1969-70 school year, and zero otherwise. As he admits, this may
be a poor indicator of the extent of negotiations. Especially during
the first full year of the amended act's existence, many schools could
have conceivably failed to file such contracts. Or alternatively, meaningful negotiations may have been occurring in many districts
without culminating in a formal contract.
Finally, although Frey considers the effects of negotiations on
both base pay and maximum pay, his conception of maximum pay
is unclear. He defines maximum pay as "base pay plus the experience increment times the number of steps on the salary schedule." 8
In terms of the salary schedule presented in Appendix A of this
study, Frey's maximum pay would presumably be equivalent to the
base salary +0.06 x 12 years, or 1.72 times the base salary. This conception of maximum pay appears to ignore all horizontal increments
in salary which may be gained through acquiring additional college credits beyond the B.A. degree. It is obvious from Appendix A
that this specification of maximum pay may seriously understate
the true maximum salary attainable and the impact of negotiations
upon that maximum.

The Hall-Carroll Study
A more geographically limited study was published in early
1973 by W. Clayton Hall and Norman Carroll. 9 They attempted
to estimate the effects of professional negotiations on both salaries
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and class size, using data from 118 elementary school districts III
suburban Cook County, Illinois, for the 1968-69 school year. Using
two alternative salary models, one of which was similar to Kasper's
formulation, the authors found a salary effect attributable to negotiations of roughly $165 to $200. Curiously, they also found that
the existence of negotiated contracts tended to increase the studentteacher ratio by about 1.3 students per teacher. Thus, it appears
that school boards may be offering organized teachers higher salaries,
but only in exchange for larger classes.
The study is a further improvement in several respects, suffering only in that its methodological explanations are sometimes inadequate or unclear. The limited geographical sample in the study
eliminates the aggregation problems of many of the previous studies.
However, the authors' specification of the variables used is imprecise, and they give no specific reason for their consideration of only
elementary districts.
The Schoenberger Study

Finally, a recently completed doctoral dissertation by R. E.
Schoenberger at Clark University adds more evidence to the questions at hand. 10 For the state of Wisconsin, Schoenberger attempted
to measure both the effects of teacher negotiations and of school
district monopsony power on teachers' salaries. Strictly speaking,
a monopsony labor market is one wherein there is only one employer of a given type of labor, although operationally monopsony
power may exist where any small number of employers exert significant wage-setting power. Economic theory suggests that where
monopsony power is predominant, wages will be established at levels
lower than those which would exist in the absence of such power.
For teachers, monopsony forces may exist where there are few geographically proximate school districts competing for teachers'
services.
Schoenberger's cross-sectional study covered the school years
1969-70, 1970-71, and 1971-72 and examined 309 of the 368 K-12
school districts in Wisconsin. Utilizing a functional formulation
similar to previous studies, he found that teacher negotiations in
Wisconsin accounted for salary differentials of about 3% on the
average. Schoenberger also found significant negative salary effects
attributable to monopsony school board power as measured by the
geographic size of the school district.
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This study is relatively free of most of the earlier conceptual
and statistical problems. Although Schoenberger does observe some
problems of multicollinearity in his regression model once a variable for urbanization is included, this does not negate his findings.
There are, however, several states which have not yet experienced
widespread school district consolidation, as has Wisconsin, and for
which a monopsony variable would seemingly be inappropriate. As
mentioned earlier, no such widespread consolidation has occurred
in Nebraska.

Summary
It should be obvious from the brief survey presented here that
meaningful research into the subject of the salary effects of professional negotiations has already been undertaken. Furthermore,
many of the conceptual and methodological weaknesses of earlier
studies are being eliminated. Yet consistency of the findings is still
somewhat lacking. On a pessimistic note, Kasper has observed:
All alternative approaches to the broad question of the effect of representation on wages in the public sector currently deserve the presumption of being
a "contribution" because (a) our knowledge of the effects in the public sector
is negligible, if not non-existent, however firm our impressions of private sector
effects; (b) the nature or style of representation in the public sector is quite
different from that in the private sector; (c) the public (nonfederal) sector is
large and expanding; and (d) collective representation within it is relatively
new and of increasing frequency. 11

More optimistically, all the studies to date indicate a relative
salary effect associated with professional negotiations ranging from
o to 5%. And, in some cases, the differences within this range are
more of interpretation than of magnitude. Baird and Landon find a
4.9% relative salary effect to be a substantial influence, whereas
Kasper attaches "little, if any" significance to a 4% effect. Perhaps,
as Kasper has suggested, "Teachers will be less incJined to quibble
about this difference than economists." 12
Nevertheless, some general shortcomings of the existing studies
may be listed. Only two of the studies, the Frey and Schoenberger
contributions, employ precise statistical techniques while limiting
the analysis to the most significant population, a state teacher
market. Use of aggregate data in the other studies may merely imply
that part of the observed impact of professional negotiations on
teachers' salary levels was actually attributable to other interstate
or interregional influences. Furthermore, there is a general incon-
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sistency in the studies with respect to the specifications of the negotiations and salary variables. These inconsistencies will be given
further attention in chapters 4 and 5. Also, the samples of the
studies tend to be primarily urban in nature, and this may again
bias the results. Finally, all of the studies are concerned only with
the impact of professional negotiations upon relative salary levels
between organized and unorganized teacher groups. This impact
is expressed as an inter-school district or interregional effect. It is
also possible, however, that negotiations have had an impact upon
the internal salary structure of a given school district, and specifically upon the secondary-elementary salary differential. The following chapter is devoted to consideration of this intra-school district
effect of professional negotiations.

4. Professional Negotiations and the
Secondary - Elementary Salary Differential

the average salary levels of secondary teachers in
the United States have consistently been higher than those of elementary teachers. Although these secondary-elementary salary differentials may be partially explained by differences in education and
experience, there has also been a tendency to view secondary teaching and elementary teaching as two distinct types of occupations,
varying in difficulty and in importance, and requiring "equalizing
differences" in compensation. As two noted authors on the subject
contend, "For a long time it was felt that elementary school teaching was both less difficult and less important than high school
teaching, and this was considered justification for paying high
school teachers more." 1
There is considerable evidence, however, that this view is changing or has changed in most school systems, and that secondary-elementary salary differentials are declining. 2 Although several plausible reasons exist for this changing view, perhaps the most significant causal factor has been the emergence of organized teacher
groups and their insistence upon the use of uniform single salary
schedules for salary determination purposes. This chapter will
briefly explore the rationale which organized labor groups in 60th
the private and public sectors have used in attempting to achieve
uniform salaries. The major portion of the chapter will then
attempt to derive empirically the magnitude and direction of the
effect which organized teacher activities have had upon the secondary-elementary salary differential in the Nebraska public schools.
HISTORICALLY,

The Private Sector Experience
It has long been a goal of trade unionism in the private sector
to impose uniform, industry-wide wage policies. "Unions in highly
competitive industries, especially those for which wages are a large
part of the cost of production, will almost always pursue a standard
wage policy within a given product market. They set uniform time
rates or piece rates for all firms so as 'to take labor out of competition.' " 3
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With respect to the internal wage structure of the firm, this
standard wage policy typically takes the form of a union contract
or other type of collective agreement whereby uniform procedures
are applied to all workers in a group, and where such procedures
can be changed only at fixed time intervals after negotiations with
the union.
The processes by which these agreements are negotiated, administered, and
enforced are included in the term "collective bargaining." The word "collective"
indicates that the agreement is negotiated on behalf of a group of workers.
The workers present a united front to their employer, and the terms of the
bargain apply uniformly to all members of the group. 4

The rationale for such a wage policy of collective uniformity
apparently lies in the belief that the potentiial for wage injustices
is substantial in the absence of such policies, especially given the
existence of some monopsony power. This view is clearly evident
in the following description by two union officials of the wage
inequity problems of the preunion steel industry.
Of all the chickens unions stir up during the organizing stage, none comes
home to roost with a louder crow than the wage inequality one . . . . Until
SWOC [Steel Workers Organizing Committee] won the first collective bargaining
contracts its research department functioned almost exclusively as an agent
to ferret out wage inequalities within plants and between plants. . . . Loud
speakers blared at the mill gates, "Who said a craneman is worth twenty
cents more in Pittsburgh than in Chicago? . . . How about your mill? Is a
millwright in the blooming mill worth eighteen cents more than a millwright
in the electric furnace department? No! . . . join the union and bring justice
to all workers!"5

Thus the trade union in the private sector has attempted partially to supplant the purely economic forces of wage determina
tion and substitute for these such criteria as "justice" and "equal
pay for equal work."
Worker protest against the competitive market concept of the employment
relationship is one of the foundation stones upon which the institution of trade
unionism in the United States has been erected. It is of the essence of trade
union wage policy that wage rates be judged in relation to such non·economic
criteria as "fairness" and "equity" and to seek to establish wage relationships
that can be rationalized in terms of these non·market values. 6

The effects of such a standard union wage policy upon the
general wage structure in the United States are far from conclusive.
With respect to the intraindustry wage structure, however, the
evidence seems to support an initial narrowing of wage differentials,

The Secondm'y-Elementary Salary Differential

/

25

although this narrowing may not continue over time. In their wellknown study of the wage structure in the United States, Lloyd
Reynolds and Cynthia Taft conclude: "The effect of union efforts
to reduce wage differentials among rival producers appears to be
moderately favorable-not so completely beneficial as unions sometimes allege, but sufficiently so to warrant a positive score for
collective bargaining." 7
And to the extent that trade unions have been successful in
negotiating a uniform wage package with an employer, the effect
upon the internal wage structure of the firm seems clearly to have
been a narrowing or elimination of any pre-existing intraoccupational wage differentials.

The Public Sector Teacher Market
The Structure of Teacher Compensation. In most school districts,
a number of factors exist which might explain salary differentials
among teachers. Most of these factors are especially significant
in explaining secondary-elementary differentials.
Perha ps the most significant factors in explaining teacher salary
determination are experience and training. It is generally felt that
teachers become more effective and productive as additional classroom experience is acquired. Training may be considered a determinant in several ways. Teachers will presumably be more effective
in the classroom if they are sufficiently educated in terms of college
preparation in education-related courses and in courses dealing
with the subject matter which they teach. Secondly, teacher salaries
may be viewed partially as compensation for the costs incurred in
acquiring a sufficient education for teaching purposes. This second
factor is not as important today in that the costs of a four-year
teacher-training program do not vary significantly among colleges,
at least in public institutions. 8 However, teachers may be given
additional compensation for college work beyond, say, the B.A.
degree. This additional compensation may be viewed either in
terms of productivity enhancement or in terms of cost compensation.
To the extent that educational levels or experience levels differ
among teachers in a given district, salary differentials can be
expected.
Teachers are also usually given additional compensation for
assuming duties of an extracurricular nature such as coaching, club
sponsorship, and the like. The existence of these extra duties in a
school district provides further justification for salary differentials.
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It is certainly also probable that market forces have some influence upon intradistrict salary differentials, although there is disagreement upon the significance of such forces. Wellington and
Winter contend that "in the public sector, too, the market operates.
In the long run, the supply of labor is a function of the price paid
for labor by the public employer relative to what workers earn
elsewhere." 9
However, two noted experts on teacher markets argue:
Sometimes market forces are recognized but usually in a sub rosa fashion, and
they are regarded as a temporary disturbance which will go away soon. In the
literature on teacher salaries the terms supply and demand appear frequently
enough, but almost always in a quite mechanistic way . . . . But rarely is attention given to the competing demands for teachers. 10

Although one can quibble about the extent to which market
forces operate, there is ample evidence to suggest that such forces
have been considered by school officials in establishing the structure
of compensation. During a period of relative teacher shortages
such as the first three-fourths of the 1960s, it was not unusual to
find additional compensation being offered by school systems to
teachers whose training was in areas of crucial shortage such as
special education, music, mathematics, etc. As Charles Perry and
Wesley Wildman have observed:
In the absence of collective bargaining, . . . differentials were set in the
interests of minimizing recruiting problems and turnover. [A school system
maintains] a compensation structure which enables it to recruit individuals
from inside and outside the system into the various positions within the organization and to retain those individuals. 11

Another factor which may contribute to salary differentials
within a school system is employer monopsony power. Even where
school district monopsony power may be insufficient to have an
impact on the general level of compensation in a district, this
power may affect the structure of compensation. School districts may
limit the differentials which would otherwise be justified for particular teachers in the system because such teachers might be particularly susceptible to any monopsony power which may exist. For
instance, young, unmarried males have much more labor market
mobility than do older, married female teachers. The lack of mobility of this latter group makes them more vulnerable to any
existing monopsony power. Intensifying this vulnerability is the
likelihood that most of these teachers would tend to be secondary
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wage earners. In short, the supply of this group of teachers is relatively inelastic. 12
It is not unreasonable to suspect that a disproportionate number of teachers possessing these vulnerable characteristics would
be elementary teachers. The vast majority of elementary teachers
in the United States are secondary wage-earning married females
who are locked in to the narrow geographic market surrounding
their husband's employment location.
Finally, the feeling may persist in some unprogressive school
districts that secondary teaching requires greater compensation
than elementary teaching for reasons not mentioned earlier. In
addition to the misconception that secondary teaching requires more
skill, it is sometimes argued that secondary teachers must be more
specialized in their academic training. Compensation should then
reflect the increased burden assumed in acquiring this specialization. Also the view is often expressed that secondary teachers must
deal with more serious discipline problems and that they should
be reimbursed for this disamenity.
Although the logic of some of the rationale presented above
may be questionable, many of these reasons have been effectively
used to justify salary differentials between secondary and elementary
teachers. Elementary teachers would seem to be more susceptible to
the internal exercise of school board monopsony power and, to the
extent that such beliefs still exist, they suffer further from the view
that elementary teaching requires less skill or competence.
Professional Negotiations and the Uniform Salary Schedule. As in
the private sector, organized teacher groups have for some time
been concerned with the salary inequality issue. Prior to organized
activity, teachers'salaries were established on the basis of an individual agreement between a teacher and the school board. As the
dissatisfaction with this type of arrangement became more widespread, a movement led by the NEA began which favored the adoption of some type of schedule which would make the salary-setting
process less arbitrary. An education historian, Hazel Davis, has
observed: "Payment of teachers' salaries according to a dependable
schedule rather than on the basis of individual bargaining has long
been recognized as important to the security and dignity of the
teaching profession." 13
The first type of schedule which became popular was the position type schedule. "In this type of schedule the school board
would establish a salary for each position in the school. ... Typi-
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cally the salaries differed from grade to grade, and high school
salaries would almost invariably be higher than those at the elementary level." 14 Altho,Ugh this type of schedule removed much
of the uncertainty and arbitrariness which had earlier typified
teacher salary determination, it certainly did little to remove the
inequities associated with secondary-elementary salary differentials.
Coincident with the more recent movement toward teacher
organization has been the widespread adoption of the type of
schedule found in Appendix A, which is commonly called the
single salary schedule. "The distinguishing characteristic of the
single salary schedule is that the salary class to which a classroom
teacher is assigned depends on the professional qualifications of the
teacher rather than the school level or assignment." 15
As the schedule in Appendix A indicates, the term professional
qualifications is defined in terms of the college training which a
teacher has acquired and the number of years of classroom teaching experience which he or she possesses. Many of the earlier disputes over salary inequalities centered on the school board's contention that different classes of teachers differed in "value" to the
school district. Hence, secondary teachers received greater compensation as a group than did elementary teachers, mathematics teachers received more than physical education teachers, etc. As teachers
developed a collective voice and began arguing for implementation
of single salary schedules,. these "value" distinctions have tended
to disappear in many school systems. "The single salary schedule
was regarded as bringing a feeling of contentment and professionalism. A teacher would no longer be an elementary teacher, but a
teacher, a member on equal footing of the profession that now
included all teachers." 16
The parallel with the private sector should be obvious. The
organized activities of teachers have included demands for salary
standardization which are similar to the earlier demands made by
private sector trade unions. And just as the evidence in the private
sector supports the belief that collective bargaining has led to
an initial narrowing of intraindustry and intraoccupational wage
differentials, a similar narrowing of such differentials should be
expected in the public sector teacher market. The following sections
of this chapter are devoted to the development and use of a multiple regression model to test this expectation with respect to the
secondary-elementary salary differential in the Nebraska public
schools.
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The Regression Model
Most of the variables which may significantly affect the magnitude of secondary-elementary salary differentials in a particular
school district have already been discussed in previous sections.
For the purposes of the model which will be developed here, the
following variables deserve reconsideration. Years of teaching experience was previously indicated as a primary determinant of teachers' salaries. In a given school district, for example, if secondary
teachers have accumulated a large number of collective years of
experience while the elementary teachers as a group are relatively
inexperienced, one would expect the average secondary-average
elementary salary differential to be fairly large, other things remaining constant.
Secondly, the training or education of teachers should be a significant determinant of teacher salaries. In those districts where
the educational attainment of secondary teachers on the average
exceeds substantially that of elementary teachers, a relatively large
average secondary-average elementary salary differential would be
expected, ceteris paribus.
Third, the extent to which the teaching staff, and especially
the elementary teaching staff, is composed of immobile, secondary
wage earners should affect the magnitude of the differential. As
indicated earlier, a school board may be able to exercise some
monopsony power over the salaries of such teachers, even in the
absence of any power to do so for all teachers in the system. Thus,
for instance, in those districts where the elementary teaching staff
is composed overwhelmingly of married females, the secondaryelementary differential might conceivably be larger than in the
absence of such a situation.
Another factor alluded to earlier was the extra compensation
paid for assuming extracurricular duties. Unfortunately, little reliable data exist for Nebraska on this type of compensation by elementary and secondary responsibilities. A priori, it would be expected that more opportunities for such extra compensation would
be available at the secondary level. Since this expectation cannot
be supported by available data, however, and since the additional
duties at the secondary level may in some cases be assumed by
elementary teachers, this variable was omitted from the model.
The significance of market forces was also mentioned previously,
specifically with respect to teacher shortages in particular subject
matter areas. This is another variable which is difficult to specify
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operationally. Furthermore, the period of time which will be the
central concern of this study is the 1970-71 school year. By this
time, the teacher shortages which were projected in the early 1960s
had virtually disappeared in Nebraska and nationally. For these
reasons, this variable was also omitted from the analysis.
Finally, the central hypothesis running through this chapter
has been that formal professional negotiations between teachers
and boards of education will tend to narrow salary differentials.
It will be expected, therefore, that where professional negotiations
are occurring, secondary-elementary salary differentials will be
smaller than in nonnegotiating districts.
Assuming linear relationships and temporarily ignoring signs,
the model may be summarized symbolically in the following regression equation form:
D = a
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where:
D

average secondary-average elementary salary differential for
a given school district

Es

teaching experience of secondary teachers in a given school
district

Ee

teaching experience of elementary teachers in a given district

Ts

training or education of secondary teachers in a given district

Te = training or education of elementary teachers in a given district
S

secondary wage earner or immobility variable for a given
district

N

1=

the presence of formal negotiations in a given district

u

-

random error term

Based upon the previous discussion of this chapter, it should
be apparent that positive signs are hypothesized for the regression
coefficients of the secondary experience (Es), secondary training
(Ts), and secondary wage earner (S) variables. Negative signs are
expected for the elementary experience (Ee), elementary training
(Te) , and negotiations (N) variables.
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The Sample
The sample consisted of 201 of Nebraska's 304 school districts
which operate schools providing education from kindergarten
through the twelfth grade (K-12 districts). The large number of
Nebraska school districts which are K-6, K-8, 7-12, or 9-12 districts
were omitted for the obvious reason that no secondary-elementary
comparisons could be made in these districts. For the 103 K-12 districts which were omitted, no reliable negotiations data were available. The sample selection process did not seem to seriously bias
the sample. It includes 60 of Nebraska's 98 Class II school districts
and 141 of the state's 206 Class III, IV, and V districts. 17 The
inclusion of numerous small rural districts in this sample provided
an urban-rural balance which has not been evident in most of
the previous work in this general subject area.
The 1970-71 school year was selected for primary analysis in
the study. As indicated in chapter 2, the legal right of teachers
to formally negotiate salaries and conditions of employment with
their employers had been firmly established in Nebraska by this
time. Both the 1967 Teachers' Professional Negotiations Act and
the 1969 amendment to the Court of Industrial Relations Act had
been enacted and implemented in a large number of Nebraska
school districts. Yet this school year was early enough in the Nebraska teacher organization movement so that unilateral school
board salary determination was still the rule in many districts.
Hence, a valid comparison between negotiating and nonnegotiating
districts was possible.
Specification of the Variables
Ordinary least-squares multiple regression analysis was used for
the cross-sectional data to estimate the simultaneous effects of the
hypothesized variables upon the secondary-elementary salary differential. The dependent variable (D) was specified as the mean secondary salary in a given district minus the mean elementary salary
in that district for the 1970-71 school year. The Nebraska Department of Education annually publishes the Nebraska Educational
Directory which contains average secondary and average elementary
salaries by district, as computed from data submitted by each district. The differentials were calculated from these data.
The variable for secondary experience was specified as the
mean years of teaching experience of all secondary professional
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employees in a district, excluding administrative personnel. Once
again, these data were available in raw form from the state Department of Education and district means were calculated therefrom.
Analysis of the data with respect to the elementary experience
variable (Ee) suggested that more than one specification might be
advised. It was not unusual to find elementary teachers with twentyfive or more years of experience, while this was highly unusual for
secondary teachers. However, this could not be considered indicative
of a superior position for elementary teachers with respect to salary
levels for several reasons. Few school districts in Nebraska continue
indefinitely to pay annual experience increments beyond a certain
maximum. Thus an elementary teacher with thirty years of teaching
experience would probably not receive a greater number of salary
increases for experience than a similar teacher with fifteen or
twenty years of experience. For instance, the NSEA annually compiles a booklet of Nebraska school districts' salary schedules. For
the 1970-71 school year only one out of more than 200 reporting
school districts allowed more than fifteen years of experience
steps on its salary schedule.
Secondly, many districts will not allow years of experience
gained in other school systems to be applied for compensation purposes. Finally, for many Nebraska elementary teachers, significant
portions of their experience were accumulated prior to receIvmg
the B.A. degree, and this experience might also not be allowed by
a school system for compensation purposes.
For all of the above reasons, three different specifications of the
elementary experience variable were employed. The first was specified simply as the mean years of total classroom experience of the
elementary teachers in a given district (E e ). The second specification
was the mean years of experience of elementary teachers in their
present system, by district (Eo'). Finally, the first specification was
modified to allow for the experience maximums often imposed by
school districts. A maximum of fifteen years of experience was
chosen and, for any district whose elementary teachers had greater
than fifteen years of mean teaching experience, fifteen was recorded
instead of the actual figure (Eo"). These means were all calculated
from the same Department of Education source used for the secondary experience variable.
It was necessary to find proxies for the secondary and elementary
training variables because raw data on years of education were
not consistently available. For the secondary training variable two
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separate forms were employed, the percentage of secondary teachers in a given district who had obtained at least the B.A. degree
(T.), and the percentage who had obtained at least the M.A. degree
(T.'). The second specification was added because in only 17 of
the 201 districts of the sample did less than 100% of the secondary
teachers have at least the B.A. degree.
For the elementary training variable (T e) only one proxy was
used, the percentage of elementary teachers in a district who had
obtained at least the B.A. degree. For the 1970-71 school year, 141
of the 201 Nebraska school districts in the sample had less than
100% of their elementary teaching staffs with at least the B.A.
degree. 18 These data on degrees held by Nebraska school personnel
were also obtained from state Department of Education sources.
As would be expected, it was difficult to devise a meaningful
specification for the secondary wage-earner variable. Data on marital
status and teacher ages were generally not available. Since it was
hypothesized that this effect would tend to be felt more strongly
at the elementary level, the proxy for this effect was defined as the
percentage of elementary teachers in a given district who were
female (S).
Finally, the negotiations variable was given considerable attention. As was indicated in chapter 3, several of the previous studies
were weakened by their questionable specifications of this variable.
In order to determine the extent to which meaningful negotiations were occurring for the 1970-71 school year, the files of the
Nebraska State Education Association were searched for master
contracts or other evidence of negotiations. Since this proved to
provide insufficient information, a brief post card questionnaire
was devised and mailed to some 325 local teachers' associations,
county teachers' associations, and superintendents. 19 The NSEA
mailing list was used for the mailing and an NSEA cover letter was
enclosed. Two hundred and twenty-one responses were received;
of these, 20 were eliminated due to duplication and inconsistencies
with NSEA files. The remaining 201 responses were used as the basis
for the sample which was selected. A dummy variable, which took
the value of one for those districts wherein formal negotiations were
occurring and zero otherwise, was used for this specification (N).

The Regression Results
The results of the ordinary least-squares estimation which was
applied to the data are presented in Table 1. The first three equa-
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tions use the three different specifications of the elementary experience variable which were described earlier while using the percentage of secondary teachers with at least the B.A. degree (Ts) as
the secondary training variable. The last three equations use the
same three elementary experience variables, each combined with
the secondary training variable T s'.
All of the regression coefficients exhibit the hypothesized signs
in all the forms that were used. As indicated by the table, all of the
variables are significant at at least the .01 level, with the exceptions
of the third elementary experience specification and the secondary
wage-earner variable in equations 3 and 6. In addition, the crucial
negotiations variable is significant in all equations at the .01 level.
The R2 values are consistent with those often obtained from state
and regional cross-sectional data of this type.
Both secondary training variables (Ts and T s') yielded coefficients which were consistent with expectations, and not unexpectedly the percentage of secondary teachers with at least the M.A.
degree (Ts') proved to be the more significant determinant, although smaller in magnitude. The secondary-elementary differential
did tend to be larger where secondary training was more extensive.
Similarly, the differential tended to be smaller in those districts
where most or all elementary teachers had obtained at least the
B.A. degree. This variable was significant at the .01 level in all
six equations.
Experience also proved to be a highly significant determinant
of the size of the differential, as a highly experienced secondary
staff tended to be associated with larger secondary-elementary salary
differentials. And in districts where elementary teachers were relatively inexperienced, the differential also tended to be larger no
matter what form the variable took. The second specification, the
mean years of elementary experience in the present system (Ee'),
proved to be the most significant, which is consistent with the
observation that many school districts in Nebraska do not accept
years of experience acquired outside the present system for compensation purposes.
Although the specification of the secondary wage-earner variable
(S) was certainly less than exact, the results do indicate that differentials tended to be larger in districts whose elementary staffs were
predominantly or solely female. However, the coefficients become
insignificant in equations 3 and 6. 20
Finally the coefficients of the negotiations variable are all highly
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significant, as mentioned earlier, and the magnitudes of these
coefficients are somewhat surprising. The results suggest that, for
the 1970-71 Nebraska school year, secondary-elementary salary
differentials did tend to be smaller by some amount between $488
and $512 in those districts whose salary package had been formally
negotiated. Although a small portion of this effect could be attributable to differences in extracurricular compensation, the estimation
still seems to provide strong empirical evidence that formal professional negotiations in the Nebraska public schools have contributed to significantly smaller secondary-elementary salary differentials.
A Check for Spurious Correlation
It is possible, of course, that the correlation between negotiations and salary differentials is a spurious one. In other words,
those Nebraska school districts which exhibited small secondaryelementary salary differentials in 1970-71 may have consistently
displayed such small differentials over time, even in the absence of
professional negotiations. If this is the case, the negotiations variable may be assuming some explanatory power which actually
should be attributed to other omitted variables. It was decided,
therefore, to compare the results of the 1970-71 regressions with
those for a year prior to the emergence of any widespread negotiations in Nebraska. 21
The 1965-66 school year was selected for this test. The necessary
data were still available but there was no evidence in NSEA files
of any formal negotiations in any Nebraska school district for this
year. The test employed the same variables which were used for
equation 1 in Table 1 and the same estimation procedure. Since
some school consolidation did occur between 1965 and 1970 it was
necessary to omit II of the 201 districts in the 1970-71 sample
because these systems were not K-12 districts in 1965-66. With the
exception of the negotiations variable, all of the 1970-71 data were
replaced with 1965-66 data from the same sources indicated earlier. The negotiations variable was entered as it appeared in the
1970-71 regressions. If the negotiations variable proved to be as
highly correlated with the salary differentials of 1965-66 as with
those of 1970-71, this would indicate that other omitted factors
besides negotiations were responsible for explaining variations in
the salary differential. The results of this test are reported in
Table 2.
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TABLE 2
Coefficients and other statistics from 1965-66 cross-sectional
regressions. Dependent variable: average secondary-average
elementary salary differential. Number of observations: 190.
N

-88.8
(1.62)"

T,
23.6
(4.17) .....

T.

E,

-8.6

-1.2

(7.32) ....

(.11)

S
.81
(.14)

5.98
(1.17)

.36

.. Significant at the .10 level in a I-tailed test.
.... Significant at the .05 level in a I-tailed test.
...... Significant at the .01 level in a I-tailed test.

First, the lower R2 suggests that those hypothesized variables
which tended to be significant determinants of teachers' salary levels
and salary differentials in 1970-71 were of less importance in 196566. The secondary and elementary training variables were still
highly significant and displayed the hypothesized signs. These coefficients were of approximately the same magnitude as in the
1970-71 regressions. This implies that levels of training or education were also important determinants of salary levels and salary
differentials in 1965-66.
Curiously, however, the secondary and elementary experience
variables not only were statistically insignificant, but also exhibited
the wrong signs. This may suggest that fewer salary schedules
which specified compensation for experience were in use during
this time. It may also be consistent with the general belief that
organized labor groups emphasize seniority and seniority rights to
a greater extent than would be the case in the absence of such
groups. Perhaps market forces may also provide a rationale for
these results. The tight labor market for teachers in 1965-66 may
have tended to negate experience differentials.
The secondary wage-earner variable was also statistically insignificant. Just as teachers appear to have possessed more monopoly
power in 1970-71 than in 1965-66, it may be that school boards
also possessed more power to exploit intradistrict differences in
labor supply elasticities in the later period.
Finally, the coefficient of the negotiations variable drops in
magnitude to -88.8 and is significant only at the .10 level. Thus
it does not appear that those negotiating districts which tended to
have smaller secondary-elementary salary differentials in 1970-71
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had equally small differentials in 1965-66. The original results of
Table 1 are generally given more credibility by the failure of the
1965-66 model to display similar explanatory power, especially with
respect to the negotiations variable.
Summary

The regression model which was developed and employed in
this chapter provides considerable evidence to support the major
hypothesis that professional negotiations for teachers have had a
significant impact upon the salary structure of the typical school
district, and specifically upon the differentials between secondary
and elementary teachers' salaries. As a rough estimate, the results
which are presented in Tables 1 and 2 suggest a net negative impact
upon the average secondary-average elementary salary differentiai
in Nebraska of between $400 and $425. The magnitude of this
effect is approximately 5% of the 1970-71 average salary of all
Nebraska public school teachers, as estimated by the NSEA. These
results, however, do not provide any evidence concerning the impact
of professional negotiations upon teachers' salary levels for the
entire teaching staff in a school district. It is conceivable, of course,
that negotiations could have merely prompted a redistribution of
the existing wage bill toward elementary teachers with no net effect
upon either the school district's average salary level or the size
of the wage bill. The following chapter addresses itself to this
second empirical question.

5. Professional Negotiations and the
Relative Wage Effect

A

S INDICATED in chapter 2, the salary levels of Nebraska public
school teachers improved substantially in the 1960s and early 1970s,
both absolutely and relative to several other states. Since this
period of time roughly parallels the emergence of professional
negotiations in the Nebraska public schools, it is logical to inquire
as to the effect that professional negotiations have had upon these
improving salary levels. The present chapter deals with this
question.
H. Gregg Lewis had distinguished among three different types
of union wage effects: (1) an effect upon the general level of money
wages, (2) an effect upon the general level of real wages, and (3) a
relative wage effect. 1 The primary concern of this chapter is with
the relative wage or salary effect which is attributable to professional negotiations in Nebraska, where this relative wage effect is
defined simply as "comparisons between wages under union and
non-union conditions." 2
The first portion of the chapter will consider the theory and
evidence on the relative wage effects of collective bargaining in the
private sector. Methodological difficulties will also be mentioned. In
the second portion of the chapter a salary determination model for
teachers will be developed and used in an attempt to determine
the relative wage effect of professional negotiations in the Nebraska
public schools.

Relative Wage Effects in the Private Sector
The Theory. The traditional framework within which to analyze
the relative wage effects of unionism in the private sector is Alfred
Marshall's treatment of derived demand in his Principles of Economics. 3 This treatment is based upon the determinants of the
elasticity of a derived demand. From this analysis it follows that
the more inelastic the demand for union labor, the smaller the
adverse employment effect associated with a given wage increase
and, therefore, the larger the probable influence of a union on
relative wages. 4 Marshall considered four determinants of the
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elasticity of a derived demand. The demand for a factor will be
more inelastic: (1) the more essential the factor is to the production
of the final good, (2) the more inelastic the demand is for the final
good, (3) the smaller is the ratio of the cost of the factor to the
total cost of the good, and (4) the more inelastic is the supply of
other factors.
The Marshallian analysis suggests the conditions which would
be most desirable from the viewpoint of the union in affecting the
wages of its members. It also suggests the probability that economic
constraints will be imposed upon the union, to the extent that
these conditions are not simultaneously present. Finally, an inelastic
demand is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for successfully
raising union wages. The union must also possess sufficient bargaining power.
Methodological Difficulties. In testing empirically the relative wage
effect of collective bargaining within an industry or occupation,
the ideal situation would be one wherein all other relevant variables are identical except for the presence or absence of the union.
Any observed wage differentials obtained in such an ideal case
could reasonably be attributed to unionization. However, this
situation can seldom be attained, anc,l the relative wage effects
that are actually obtained may reflect factors other than collective
bargaining which were omitted from the analysis.
Furthermore, it is often argued that the presence of unions in
some plants forces not only union employers but also nonunion
employers to raise wages, the latter occurring so as to prevent the
unionization of nonunion workers. To the extent that these "threat
effects" or "spillover effects" are present, the observed relative wage
effect would understate the true union impact.
Because of these difficulties, empirical estimates of relative wage
effects cannot be considered precise. It should not be thought, however, that the existence of such difficulties makes meaningful empirical work impossible in this area. The difficulties presented by
omitted variables have been lessened in recent years as more sophisticated statistical techniques and more precise variable specification
have been used. With respect to the possibility of threat effects,
Albert Rees has observed that the outcome from such effects is far
from clear.
In some cases, the union wage increase may be emulated. In others, the effect
wiII operate through the labor market in the opposite direction. The higher
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wages in the union sector will tend to check the growth of employment in that
sector, which will increase the supply of labor to the non-union sector and
tend to check increases in non-union wages. 5

Some Evidence. Numerous studies have been undertaken in an
attempt to derive the relative wage effect of private sector unions
in a given industry or industry group. Only a brief sampling of
some findings will be presented here. 6
Perhaps the first major study of this kind was conducted by
Paul H. Douglas in 1930. 7 He analyzed percentage wage changes
in fourteen unionized and nonunionized industries and concluded
that the unions in these industries were initially a source of wage
advantage but that in later years the rates of increase for union
workers' wages were no greater than for nonunion workers. A 1948
study by Arthur Ross and a 1950 study by Ross and William
Goldner reached essentially the same conclusions. 8
With respect to single industry studies, the findings vary considerably. These variations may be partially explained by differences
in such factors as: the type of union, i.e. craft or industrial; the
stage of the business cycle when the study was conducted; the
percentage of industry workers who were organized; and whether or
not the industry was faced with a declining product demand over
time.
Stephen Sobotka's study of the construction industry from 1915
to 1950 found that unions had gained as much as a 25% advantage
for highly skilled workers and 5% for unskilled workers.9 Elton
Rayack found an over-all 5% advantage in the men's clothing
industry, although this advantage declined over time. 10 In rubber
tire manufacturing, Irvin Sobel estimated a union wage advantage
of 5%-10%, again declining after World War n.ll Joseph Scherer
found a 10% wage advantage in large city hotels, with most of the
significant gains made in the late 1930s. 12
There is some evidence that the union impact becomes smaller
during inflationary periods. Rees found only a negligible union
impact on wages in the post-World War II steel industry. 13 The
effect was so small that Rees was led to conclude that collective
bargaining may have actually retarded the upward movement of
wages in this period. Similarly, John Maher found little or no
union impact on wages in four of the seven 1950 industries which
he studied and only a 5%-10% effect in the other three. 14
Both Rees and Lewis have estimated an over-all average effect
of U.S. unions on wages in the neighborhood of 10%-15%. The
studies cited here also seem generally to suggest that the most sig-
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nificant gains of private sector trade unions came in the late 1930s
and that their wage impact may have been declining since then.
In the public sector, the existing empirical work which was
summarized in chapter 3 suggested a relative wage effect no greater
than 5% associated with the organized activities of public school
teachers. The limited work on state teacher markets found no effect
greater than 3%. Given Wellington and Winter's concern with the
potential for abuse of public sector unionism, it is somewhat surprising that these effects seem to be smaller than the corresponding
private sector effects during initial stages of organization. As indicated in chapter 3, however, there are some general shortcomings
of the existing studies which may limit their explanatory and
predictive power. The following sections will analyze the impact of
professional negotiations on Nebraska teachers' salary levels, and,
in the process, an attempt will be made to overcome some of the
problems of these earlier analyses.
A Model of Teacher Salary Determination

In delineating those factors which are considered by school
boards in determining teachers' salaries, it was hoped that there
existed consistent, objective criteria which were employed by most
school boards. Unfortunately, such criteria do not generally exist.
As Joseph Kershaw and Roland McKean have observed:
In the first place, the public schools are producing a service-education for
the young-which is not marketed at a price to the customers. It is financed
by taxing the whole community-both those who do and those who do not
use the product. Not only is this product not sold on the market, but it
is very difficult even to specify what the product is, and just how the indio
vidual teacher contributes to it. This makes the problem of setting teachers'
salaries particularly difficult. In a competitive business that markets its output,
if wages are set too high, losses will occur; if too low, employees of the right
quality cannot be retained and again losses wiII show up after awhile. Schools
have no such cIearcut indicator, so that when it is time to determine salary
levels, or relations among salaries, this test of the market is not available to
assist in the determination. One result is that school boards are forever grappling
with the problem of just what factors they should be taking into consideration. 15

This statement depicts some of the problems inherent in salary
determination throughout the public sector. Fortunately, in recent
years both theoretical and empirical research on this issue have
been conducted which permit the specification of certain factors
that are generally of concern to the school board in the salary
determination process. 16
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Ability and Willingness to Pay. Since the services provided by a
school district are not sold to the consumers at a price but rather
are financed by general taxation, any market forces which may be
operating are constrained by the amount of fi~ancial resources
available to a school district and its willingness to tap these
resources for the provision of educational services. In short, two
almost universal determinants of teachers' salaries are the school
district's ability to pay and its willingness to pay educational costs.
According to Perry and Wildman:
In recent years, the primary determinant of the level of teacher compensa·
tion in individual school districts has been the ability of the district to pay ....
Because teacher compensation is the major cost element in the operation of
the school system, it has been the ability of school systems to finance salary
increases which has determined the extent to which these market forces have
been translated into short·run salary adjustments. 17

However, ability to pay alone may not be reflected accurately
in teachers' salaries if the residents of the school district are not
willing to finance such salaries and other costs through taxation.
If, as is usually the case, the total wage bilI plus other costs is
somehow determined first and then tax rates are adjusted so as to
generate the necessary revenue, one might expect some negative
relationship between ability to pay and willingness to pay in many
districts, especially in the absence of professional negotiations.
Some evidence of this exists in the regression analysis which follows.

Size of the School District. In addition to ability and willingness
to pay, it appears from previous work that the size of the school
district has some effect upon the level of teachers' salaries. Specifically, salaries tend to be higher in the larger districts. This may be
the case for several reasons. The cost of living is generally lower
in those smaller communities which constitute the centers of most
small school districts. This may be used as a partial justification
for paying lower salaries. The cost of living is a factor often mentioned by school boards in their salary discussions, according to
Kershaw and McKean. 18 It may also be that larger districts offer
more specialized programs which require greater teacher skills.
Furthermore, larger districts are typically located in more urbanized
areas where competition for teachers' services is keener. Finally, it
may be that there is more disutility associated with teaching in a
large school district because of the impersonal working environment, the disciplinary problems, or other disadvantages related to
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the bureaucratic atmosphere. To the extent that this is the case,
larger districts would be required to pay higher salaries so as to
overcome these disutilities.

Labor Market Structure. Labor market structure considerations
may also affect teachers' salaries. Several of the studies surveyed
in chapter 3 found that the possession of school district monopsony
power did adversely affect teachers' salaries. As mentioned in previous chapters, school district consolidation in Nebraska has not
been widespread. There are, therefore, a very large number of
independent school districts in the state, which implies that school
district monopsony power should be small or nonexistent in most
districts. Nevertheless, consideration will be given in the analysis
to this possible salary determinant.
Finally, the central hypothesis of this chapter is that teachers'
salaries are partially determined by teacher monopoly power. Given
the relatively insignificant monopsony power which is expected in
Nebraska school districts and the historically low salaries of the
state's teachers, the relative salary effect of professional negotiations
in Nebraska should provide an estimate approaching the upper
limit attainable through organized teacher activities.
The Formal Model. The factors discussed above constitute the
variables which are hypothesized as determinants of Nebraska
teachers' salary levels. 19 Assuming linear relationships, the model
may be summarized in the following regression equation form:
S
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_

teacher salary level by district
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-

school district ability to pay
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school district willingness to pay
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school district size (enrollment)

M

school district monopsony power

N

teacher monopoly power (professional negotiations)

u

random error term
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The preceding discussion suggests that positive signs should
be expected for the coefficients of all the independent variables
except the monopsony variable (M). As will be seen in the section
on specification of the variables which follows, the particular
specification of the monopsony variable which was chosen implies
a positive sign for this variable, also.

The Sample
The sample consisted of 181 K-12 Nebraska school districts.
The key factor in selecting the sample was once again the availability of reliable information on the presence or absence of negotiations in a given school district. Thus, the same sample of 201
school districts which was used in chapter 4 was first selected. Of
these 201 districts, 20 more were omitted because salary data of
the type needed for the model were not available. Again, the sample
seemed generally to be representative of the entire population of
Nebraska's K-l2 school districts, including the rural-urban balance
noted earlier. For the same reasons which were given in chapter
4, the 1970-71 school year was selected once more for primary
analysis in the study.

Specification of the Variables
Ordinary least-squares multiple regression analysis was again
employed in deriving all the estimated coefficients. Specification of
the dependent variable (S) was of special importance and five
different specifications resulted. Following the lead of previous
studies, four points on the salary schedule of a given school district
were selected for the first four specifications. These points were
the B.A. minimum (S1), B.A. maximum (S2), M.A. minimum (S3)'
and M.A. maximum (S4) salary levels as read off the salary schedule.
These points are representative of the entire salary schedule for a
district, and they are often considered the strategic targets of professional negotiations.
However, these points may not be indicative of actual salaries
paid by a district because actual salaries are dependent upon where
teachers are placed on the schedule. For this reason, a fifth specification was defiined as the average actual salary level of all classroom
teachers in a district (S5)' Although average salaries may not be
the direct target of professional negotiations, they may be said to
reflect the economic benefits derived from such negotiations.
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There is a problem involved with the inclusion of this last
specification. An average salary measure presumably includes the
influence of interdistrict variations in the education and experience
of teachers, and no independent variables were included to account
for these variations. However, since the effects of these variations
in education and experience were considered in the previous chapter, it was concluded that the advantages of being able to estimate
the economic benefits of professional negotiations through this
variable outweighed the disadvantages.
The 1970-71 data on school district salary schedules were obtained from the annual publication, Nebraska Salary Schedules,
compiled by the NSEA. Average salary figures were obtained from
the 1970-71 Nebraska Educational Directory, published by the
Nebraska Department of Education.
A given school district's ability to pay (A) is dependent upon
its local financial resources plus any state supplements to those
resources which may be forthcoming. The following formula was
used in deriving the measure for ability to pay:
(V

+

A

A,,)
1\1

E

where:
V

1970 assessed property valuation by district

As = 1970 state aid by district
M

1970 general educational fund mill levy by district

E

1970-71 resident enrollment by district
The

~

ratio is a measure of the additional assessed valuation

which would be necessary to generate local tax revenues equal to
the state aid. This formulation allows both sides of the numerator
of the formula to be expressed in comparable terms. 20 Inclusion
of current enrollment (E) as the denominator of the formula allows
the expression of the measure on a per pupil basis. Property valuation, mill levy, and enrollment data were all available from the
Nebraska Educational Directory. State aid figures were obtained
from the 1970-71 Financial Report submitted by each school district to the state Department of Education.
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Devising an appropriate measure of a school district's willingness to pay (W) was not as difficult as first expected. 21 Although
several variations of this variable have been defined in other work,
they all amount to some measure of a community's willingness to
tax itself for educational purposes. The simplest and yet most
precise measure of this willingness, and the one utilized here, is
the general educational fund mill levy of a district.
The school district size variable (E) was simply defined as total
resident enrollment, but for the monopsony variable (M) only a
rough proxy could be specified. Following the work of Landon
and Baird and of Schoenberger, monopsony power was defined in
terms of the number of school districts in a county. If monopsony
power exists in a school district, it presumably could be exercised
more easily in those geographic areas where only a few school
districts exist to compete for the services of teachers. Although a
county may not be the ideal geographic unit to use for this purpose, it appeared to be as good as any other. Since monopsony
power should be greater where the number of competing districts
is small, the expected sign of the coefficient of this variable is
positive, as mentioned earlier. Again, the Nebraska Educational
Directory provided the data on number of school districts per
county.
The negotiations variable (N) employed was once more a
dummy variable of the same form and obtained from the same
sources as the one used in chapter 4.

The Regression Results
The results of the regressions are summarized in Table 3. One
regression equation was estimated for each of the five specifications
of the salary variable. With the exception of the monopsony
variable, all of the regression coefficients exhibited the expected
signs and were significant at at least the .I 0 level. The negotiations
variable was again significant in all cases at the .01 level.
The R2 values show somewhat more variation than the values
derived in chapter 4. This is not totally surprising, however, nor
is it inconsistent with the similar variations found in other studies
using salary specifications of this type. One would not expect the
hypothesized variables to have equal explanatory power for all
points on the salary schedule. The values of these points are
partially determined by the recruiting and retention needs of
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individual school districts. Furthermore, it would be expected
that these values are affected by the number of teachers who
actually qualify for placement on the different steps in particular
districts.

TABLE 3
Coefficients and other statistics from 1970-71 cross-sectional
regressions. Dependent variables: BA minimum (S1)' BA maximum (S2)' MA minimum (S3)' and MA maximum (S4) salary
schedule steps; and average salary level (S5). Number of observations in each regression: lSI.

Equation

Dependent
Variable

A

W

E

M

N

R2

S1

.002
(2.51) .... "

3.97
(4.37)· ....

.009
(6.69) ......

S.39
(2.07)"*

122.92
(7.9S)·....•

.54

2

S2

.006
(1.35)"

17.56
(4.63) ......

.041
(7.23) .... "

12.52
(.74)

293.55
(4.56) ......

.44

3

S3

.006
(2.74) ......

4.63
(2.20)"*

.005
(1.46)"

-7.35
(.7S)

301.0S
(S.43) ......

.39

4

S4

.025
(3.S0) ......

24.S6
(4.10) ......

.049
(5.32)" "*

41.4S
(1.53)"

795.37
(7.72) .....

.50

5

S5

.012
(2.67) ......

11.93
(2.90)**"

.030
(4.S5) ......

-9.96
(.54)

609.30
(S.71)·....•

.47

"Significant at the .10 level in a I-tailed test .
.... Significant at the .05 level in a I-tailed test.
...... Significant at the .01 level in a I-tailed test.

The coefficients of the ability to pay variable (A) were all consistent with the hypothesis. The drop in significance of the coefficient when associated with the B.A. maximum salary level (S2)
is interesting. Presumably, many districts with a substantial ability
to pay as defined are able to employ a higher quality teacher.
Therefore, they may wish to establish a relatively low B.A. maximum salary so as to provide an incentive for their teachers to seek
the M.A. degree. Relatively poor districts may have few teachers
with the M.A. degree. Teachers in such poor districts would tend
to concentrate their salary demands at the B.A. maximum level.
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The willingness to pay variable (W) also proved to be a significant determinant of teachers' salaries. As mentioned earlier, however, there is evidence that willingness to pay and ability to pay
are negatively related. The simple correlation coefficient between
the two variables was -.29, not large enough to cause any significant
multicollinearity problems but of sufficient magnitude to suggest
such a negative relationship in some districts.
Teachers' salaries also seemed to be significantly affected by
the size of the school district (E), although this factor loses some
of its significance at the M.A. minimum step. No explanation was
apparent for this loss of significance.
As suspected, school board monopsony power (M) was not found
to be a very important factor in salary determination. The coefficients of the monopsony variable were statistically insignificant
in three of the five equations, and they even became negative for
the M.A. minimum and average salary specifications.
Finally, the negotiations variable (N) proved to be a highly
significant determinant of teachers' salary levels in all equations
used. In terms of points on the salary schedule, the results suggest
that those districts which were engaged in professional negotiations
did pay higher salaries than those which were not, even when the
other factors are taken into account. At the B.A. minimum level,
the difference was $123, or about 2% of the average B.A. minimum
salary in nonnegotiating districts. At the B.A. maximum step the
differential was about $293, or 4.2%. For the M.A. minimum step,
negotiating districts paid $301 more, or 4.1 %, and at the M.A.
maximum level, the differential was $795, or 7.2%.
It is not surprising that professional negotiations seemed to
have a greater impact at the upper steps than at the lower steps.
As indicated previously, it has been argued that market forces are
more predominant at the entering step and that bargaining is more
effectively manifested at the upper steps. 22 Furthermore, those
teachers who are most active in the negotiations process tend to be
career teachers who fall on the upper steps of the salary schedule.
As Perry and \,yildman conclude:
The exercise of teacher power has led to larger increases for long service
teachers and for teachers with an M.A. degree than would have been forthcoming in the absence of the exercise of power. These increases have tended to
benefit the most active members of the teacher organization at the expense of
inactive members or non·members.23
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Finally, in terms of average actual salaries equation 5 indicates
that negotiating districts paid salaries averaging $609 higher than
nonnegotiating districts in 1970-71. This is 8.4% of the average
salary in nonnegotiating districts. Although no variables for the
composition of the teaching staff were included, this effect is still
somewhat larger than those which have been estimated in previous
studies.
The Spurious Correlation Check
It was again possible that those negotiating districts which paid
higher teachers' salaries in 1970-71 had always paid higher salaries,
irrespective of negotiations. A check for spurious correlation similar
to the one employed in chapter 4 was used to explore this possibility.
Once again, the 1965-66 school year was selected for the test.
However, there were no reliable data on salary schedules for this
year. The test was therefore limited to the variables used in equation 5 of Table 3, the data for which were available from the same
sources indicated earlier. The same estimation procedure was
employed and the same eleven consolidated districts which were
omitted in chapter 4 were deleted from this sample. Data from
1970-71 were replaced with 1965-66 data, except that the negotiations variable was entered as in the 1970-71 regressions.
As before, if the results showed that the negotiations variable
was as highly correIa ted wi th 1965-66 salary levels as with those of
1970-71, the implication would be that omitted variables other
than professional negotiations were responsible for explaining
variations in Nebraska teachers' salary levels. The results of this
test are presented in Table 4.
The R2 value suggests that the model has somewhat greater
explanatory power for 1965-66 than for 1970-71. On the surface
this may seem surprising, but with further thought it appears to
be consistent with expectations.
The ability to pay variable is again a significant determinant.
The magnitudes of the coefficient and the t-statistic imply that
ability to pay may have been a more important factor in teachers'
salary determination in the earlier year. A similar observation can
be made for both the willingness to pay variable and the district
size variable.
Although school district monopsony power did not prove to
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be of much importance in the salary determination process for
1970-71, it assumes somewhat more significance in the 1965-66
regression. It is conceivable that teacher monopoly power overwhelmed any school board monopsony power which existed in
1970-71. This was clearly not the case in 1965-66.

TABLE 4
Coefficients and other statistics from 1965-66 cross·sectional regressions. Dependent variable: average teacher salary by district. Number of observations:
170.
Dependent
Variable
S5

A

.028
(8.26)"'"

w
28.54
(10.57)"""

E

.030
(6.75)" ....

M

22.82
(1.99)""

N

52.77
(1.33)"

R2
.61

"Significant at the .10 level in a I-tailed test.
""'Significant at the .05 level in a I-tailed test.
.... "Significant at the .01 level in a I-tailed test.

The negotiations variable is the least important of all the
1965-66 variables, being significant only at the .1 0 level. The
coefficient suggests that 1970-71 negotiating districts paid salaries
which were only about $53 higher on the average than other
districts in 1965-66.
These results once again support the major hypothesis that
professional negotiations have contributed significantly to increased
teachers' salary levels. The 1970-71 negotiations variable loses
most of its explanatory power when applied to 1965-66 data, although collectively the increased explanatory power of the other
variables more than compensates for this loss.

Su.mmary
The results of the estimation procedure conducted in this
chapter, as summarized in Tables 3 and 4, do suggest that professionally negotiated Nebraska teachers' salaries were significantly
higher than unilaterally determined salaries for the 1970-71 school
year. The relative wage effect associated with professional negotiations, in terms of points on the salary schedule, ranged from $123
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to $795, or from roughly 2% to 7% of nonnegotiating districts'
salary levels. In terms of actual average compensation levels, the
net relative wage effect was in the neighborhood of $550, or approximately 8% of unorganized districts' salary levels.
As mentioned previously, these effects are somewhat larger than
those found in most other studies of teachers' salaries. At least
two tentative reasons have already been suggested for this. First,
Nebraska teachers' salary levels were among the lowest in the
country in the early 1960s. The emergence of professional negotiations in the late 1960s provided a convenient mechanism through
which to facilitate the "catching up" process. Secondly, monopsony
school board power does not seem generally to be as influential a
force in Nebraska as in many other states and regions. The teacher
organization movement was, therefore, not confronted with the
market resistance which apparently typified several other teacher
markets. A possible third explanation for the magnitude of the
effect is that Nebraska school districts enjoyed almost total spending
autonomy in 1970-71 and previously. The effectiveness of professional negotiations was not hindered in any significant way by
state-imposed spending lids or by restrictions on local mill-levying
authority. As suggested earlier, given this relatively favorable environment for the introduction and growth of organized teacher
activities, it may be that the relative wage effects which were estimated in this chapter are among the highest which can be expected
from professional negotiations for public school teachers, at least
in the existing economic climate.

6. Conclusions and Suggestions
For Further Research

Further Interpretation of Results

IT

HAS BEEN a basic hypothesis of this study that professional
negotiations for public school teachers have had an impact upon
both the structure and the level of teacher compensation. This
expectation has been confirmed in the analysis of chapters 4 and 5,
at least insofar as Nebraska teachers are concerned. The results of
cha pter 4 suggest that secondary-elementary salary differentials
within a given Nebraska school district tended to be significantly
smaller, by over $400, where salaries were professionally negotiated.
There is little other evidence on the wage structure impact of
professional negotiations, and further research is clearly warranted
on this subject. 1
With respect to the impact of professional negotiations upon
relative salary levels, the results presented in chapter 5 suggest a
salary differential ranging from approximately $123 to almost $800
associated with organized school districts. The relative wage effect
varies from roughly 2% to 8%. Although this effect is somewhat
larger than those found in previous similar studies, it has been
argued here that Nebraska may not truly be a representative teacher
market due to the unusually favorable economic and political
environment for professional negotiations found in this state.
Nevertheless, the relative wage effects which were derived for
Nebraska in this study may be extremely useful as rough estimates
of the upper extreme presently attainable through professional
negotia tions.
Even though the magnitudes of the estimated relative wage
effects may not seem large in an absolute sense, it should be noted
that the period of time in question was one of rather persistent
inflation. H. Gregg Lewis has estimated a relative wage effect
range of from 0% to 5% attributable to unions for the private
sector of the economy during such periods of inflation. 2 Relative
to these estimates, the magnitudes of the effects derived here
assume somewhat greater significance.

53

54

/

Some Salary Effects of Professional Negotiations

However, it is still probable that ability-to-pay constraints which
confront public sector organizations are a characteristic which
distinguishes them from most private sector institutions. To the
extent that this is the case, public sector unions may have considerable difficulty in fully exploiting any existing labor demand
inelasticities. Perhaps these ability-to-pay constraints explain why
the relative wage effects derived in this and other studies have not
been as large as those which Wellington and Winter envisioned.
Although the favorable environment found in Nebraska may
have introduced an upward bias in the magnitudes of the observed
effects, the sample selection process of this study may actually have
resulted in a bias in the opposite direction. The availability of
salary and negotiations data necessitated limiting the samples of
chapters 4 and 5 to K-12 Nebraska school districts. The lowest
teachers' salaries in Nebraska, however, tend to generally be found
in small rural school districts of a K-6 or K-8 structure. As indicated
previously, there is little evidence of the existence of formal
negotiations in these rural districts. Had the data been available,
the inclusion of a number of these districts in the sample would
undoubtedly have resulted in both a greater structural impact and
a larger relative wage effect associated with professional negotiations.
Finally, on a somewhat more speculative note one must certainly
consider the future prospects for professional negotiations in Nebraska as being relatively favorable. All available evidence, presented here and elsewhere, suggests that the teacher organization
movement will continue to be dominated by the NEA in Nebraska,
with little successful encroachment by the AFT. The relatively
conservative political environment found in Nebraska and the
successful development of the public sector bargaining framework
culminating with the CIR are both factors which suggest that the
strike will be a very uncommon recourse in future public sector
disputes, as it has been in the past. Short of a renewed constitutionality challenge, the present statutory provisions would appear
to be more than adequate for dealing with foreseeable disputes.
Suggestions for Further Research

In addition to the need for further research on the salary
structure effects of professional negotiations, a number of other
related areas of inquiry deserve mention. The persistent problem
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of spill-over effects has always plagued research efforts on the impact
of organized labor. There is a need for the development of a
research methodology which isolates these effects with some precision so that the union effect may be estimated more accurately.
Also, the impact of professional negotiations may not be limited
to salary effects. Little is known about the influence of organized
teacher activities on class size, fringe benefit compensation, the
incidence of teacher moonlighting, teaching staff turnover rates,
etc. For instance, it would be especially interesting to estimate the
extent to which organized teacher groups are successful in maintaining present staff levels in the face of projected declining public
school enrollments in the near future. In the long run effects of
this type may actually be of greater importance than the salary
effects, and research attention should be given to them.
In terms of long-run considerations, several other questions
arise. In the private sector, long-run time-series estimates of union
relative wage effects generally have shown significant initial wage
gains followed by a declining impact over time. It remains to be
determined whether such a trend will also become prevalent in the
public sector, although recent occurrences lend support to this
expectation. Certainly, resistance to public sector union demands
can be expected to intensify over the long run, both because of
ability-to-pay limitations and because of clearly observable recent
changes in sentiment toward public employees. In the past, the
relative salary disadvantage of public sector workers was common
knowledge. During the last ten years, however, this disadvantage
has largely disappeared, and this change has also become common
knowledge. For teachers, specifically, there is some a priori justification for expecting such a declining effect. As Perry and Wildman
have concluded:
In the absence of technological change which reduces the ratio of certificated
personnel to students, there is no strong basis to predict that collective bargaining
and teacher group power can or will have a permanent effect on the level of
teacher salaries and compensation. Without such a change, there is no certainty
that either the community or the school system will, over the long run, provide
the funds required to finance such increases. Thus, the short-run increases in
compensation achieved through collective bargaining and the exercise of teacher
group power should perhaps, at this time, be regarded as the result of a shift
in time of compensation increases. 3

There is the further question of whether school boards in states
such as Nebraska will be able to retain their spending autonomy
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the future, and of what effect any lost autonomy will have on
the power of local teacher organizations. According to Myron
Lieberman and Michael H. Moskow:

III

It seems likely. therefore, that there will be decreasing fiscal independence
for school boards and greater emphasis upon the preparation and approval of
school budgets as part of a larger scheme of public finance. Negotiations by
teachers and other groups of public employees will have to be coordinated, and
such coordination will result in some decrease in the autonomy of local school
boards. 4

This diminished local autonomy may come in the form of the
aforementioned state-imposed spending lids, restrictions on local
mill-levying authority, and/or legislation for the mandatory equalization of resources among districts. The issue of equalization has
gained added support from recent court decisions, and its emergence
has very significant implications for the future effectiveness of professional negotiations. According to Lieberman and Moskow:
Collective negotiations could intensify existing inequalities of educational opportunity. In affluent school districts, teacher pressure may be effective in achieving
greater expenditures for education. In poor school districts, such pressure will
be relatively ineffective; the local school district may simply not have the
resources to meet teacher demands . . . . Should this happen, the result might be
even greater pressure to finance education from state and federal instead of local
sources. 5

There is some evidence from this study that those districts with
greater available resources do pay higher teacher salaries. However,
the contention of Lieberman and Moskow that professional negotiations may intensify inequalities in educational opportunity is one
which should be given a thorough empirical analysis.
Finally, it is possible that professional negotiations may have
an effect upon the rate of school district consolidation in different
parts of the country. As teachers become more unified at the local,
state, and national levels in their demands for higher salaries and
improved working conditions, some pressure may be felt by local
school districts to unite in order to effectively resist such demands.
Consolidation would also offer certain advantages for districts which
are faced with the necessity of generating additional school revenues.
The extent to which this effect actually materializes is another
important empirical question for future researchers.
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University, 1971).
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Appendix A.
A Hypothetical Salary Index Schedule
For Teachers

Step

BA

BA+9

BA+18

BA+27

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

1.00
1.06
U2
U8
1.24

1.05
l.l1
l.l7
1.23
1.29
1.35

l.l0
1.17
1.24
1.31
1.38
1.45
1.52

l.l5
1.22
1.29
1.36
1.43
1.50
1.57
1.64
1.71

11

12

BA+36
orMA

1.20
1.28
1.36
1.44
1.52
1.60
1.68
1.74
1.82
1.90
1.98

MA+I8

MA+36

Ed.D.

1.30
1.38
1.46
1.54
1.62
1.70
1.78
1.86
1.94
2.02
2.10
2.18

1.40
1.49
1.58
1.67
1.76
1.85
1.94
2.03
2.12
2.21
2.30
2.39
2.48

1.60
1.69
1.78
1.87
1.96
2.05
2.14
2.23
2.32
2041
2.50
2.59
2.68

In the above schedule, the vertical increments under the heading
"Step" represent years of teaching experience. The horizontal steps
are for the successful completion of additional hours of college
credit beyond the indicated degree. Given a base salary, a uniform
schedule of this type allows for the computation of any teacher's
salary by merely multiplying the base salary by the index number
located at the appropriate horizontal and vertical step.
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Appendix B.
Reproductions of Questionnaires
Form sent to local teachers' associations:
Name of School _____________________________________________________
1) For what school year did teachers at your school first engage in
formal or informal professional negotiations which resulted in a
bilateral agreement?
2) Would you classify these first negotiations as formal or informal?

3) Have annual negotiations occurred continuously since the above
date?
4) Additional Comments _______________________________________________

Form sent to county teachers' associations:
Name of schools represented ________________________________________
by your organization
In as many of the above schools as you can determine, for what
school year did teachers in that school first engage in formal or
informal professional negotiations which resulted in a bilateral
agreement? (If no negotiations have as yet occurred, write
none.)

Additional Comments
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